Critically Evaluate The Cognitive Theory Of Stereotyping. Essay Example For Students

Critically Evaluate The Cognitive Theory Of Stereotyping. Essay Word Count: 3201B231: Social Interaction, Exam Paper 1998, Question 4. Graeme GordonStereotyping is a form of pre judgement that is as prevalent in todays society as it was 2000 years ago. It is a social attitude that has stood the test of time and received much attention by social psychologists and philosophers alike. Many approaches to, or theories of stereotyping have thus been raised. This essay evaluates the cognitive approach that categorisation is an essential cognitive process that inevitably leads to stereotyping. Hamilton (1979) calls this a depressing dilemma. Browns (1995) definition of stereotyping through prejudice is the holding of derogatory social attitudes or cognitive beliefs, the expression of negative affect, or the display of hostile or discriminatory behaviour towards members of a group on account of their membership to that group. This definition implies that stereotyping is primarily a group process, through the individuals psyches within that group. A further idea of stereotyping, defined by Allport (1954) as thinking ill of others without warrant, is that people make their mind up without any personal experience. This pre judgement about a whole group is then transferred to the stigmatisation of any individuals in that group. It is these ideas that the essay aims to evaluate, through the cognitive process of categorisation and the above definitions that bring about three distinct features of stereotyping, that our cognition can be demonstrated through. The first characteristic of stereotyping is over-generalisation. A number of studies conducted found that different combinations of traits were associated with groups of different ethnic and national origin (Katz and Braly, 1933). However, stereotyping does not imply that all members of a group are judged in these ways, just that a typical member of a group can be categorised in such judgements, that they possess the characteristics of the group. Still, when we talk of a group, we do so by imagining a member of that group. The second feature and characteristic of stereotyping is the exaggeration of the difference between ones own group (the in-group) and the other group (the out-group). This can be traced back to the work of Tajfel during the 1950s the accentuation principle (Tajfel, 1981). Tajfels work was specifically on physical stimuli, and concluded that judgements on such stimuli are not made in isolation, but in the context of other factors. Applied socially a judgement about an out-group relies upon other factors surrounding the judgement in question, as well as making a statement about the in-group and the relationship between the two groups. Through stereotyping and categorisation we exaggerate the differences between the groups. From this comes the effect that in believing an out-group is homogenous, through exaggerated differences, their in-group is not with very much less over-generalisation taking place (Linville, et al., 1986). The third characteristic of stereotyping is that of the expression of values. Most stereotypical judgements of group characteristics are in fact moral evaluations (Howitt, et al., 1989). For example, Katz and Braly (1933) studied a group of students attitudes to towards minority groups. They found that Jews were attributed to being mean (in terms of money), rather than they themselves being spendthrifts. Also, they found that there was a strong view that French people were excitable. This actually implies that they are over-excitable above the norm, as everybody is excitable, per se, and thus there would be no necessity to mention it. Concluding from this, it is valid to say that a value has been put on a characteristic in this case, a stereotypical one. A criticism with much of this research is that participants are asked to make judgements out of social context in abstract situations. Howitt, et al. (1989) say that this leads to a derogatory implication: that attributing a group with a characteristic is also withholding others. However, stereotyping leads to more than merely placing an adjective onto a group or category. The cognitive processes that give reason to stereotyping are much deeper than this, giving rise to the above characteristics. The cognitive approach to stereotyping is that we all stereotype, at varying levels because of the essential cognitive process of categorisation (Brown, 1995). Howitt, et al. (1989) take this view also, and add that it is an ordinary process of thought to over-generalise, and then protect it. We live in a complex social environment, which we need to simplify into groups, or categories. This simplification is present at all levels of life it is part of our language, distinguishing between dog and cat, male and female, and even in the basic motives of distinguishing between food and non-food. Such categorisation may seem linguistically simple, but is essential for example, the classification of elements and organisms by biologists and chemists: one of the most basic functions of all organisms is the cutting up of the environment into classifications (Rosch, et al., 1976). However, the point must be made that, even though language suggests so, categorisation leads to different functions and features in non-humans and humans. For stereotyping is not present in non-humans, thus, we may come to the conclusion that stereotyping is possible through linguistics this topic is discussed further later. This categorisation also has varying depths of moral meaning, or value, which c an lead to varying levels of stereotyping. For example, the categorisation of Catholic Protestant in Northern Ireland. Categorisation is seen as a way of ordering what we perceive (Billig, 1985), stimuli of the external world that needs to be simplified, using iconic images, to pass into our short-term memory (Neisser, 1976). This simplification process transforms James blooming, buzzing confusion into a more manageable world in which it is easier to adapt categorisation is a cognitive adaptation. For we do not have the capability to respond differently to each stimulus, whether it be a person, an object, or an event. Categorisation is important in every day life, as well as in the most extreme of circumstances for example, the discrimination between friend and foe. For categorisation to be useful, we enhance the difference between groups. This was found to be the case at both social and physical levels, and later became known as the accentuation principle (see above). However, the distinction between physical stimuli and social objects must be made clear. We ourselves our social objects, thus, we are implicated by such categorisations. As Hogg and Abrams (1988) state: it would be perilous to disregard this consideration. This can be seen in the accentuation of out-group homogeneity (Park and Rothbart, 1982). Mary Flannery O’Connor Analysis EssayWe are aware of the possibility and ability to change. However, we do not express this flexibility because it is a disruption of the norm, or, of the social group-thought. Goffman (1959) views everyday life as dramaturgical (All the worlds a stage, and all the men and women merely players Shakespeare). To disrupt this would be to change the script, and break out of the conformity of the social group, self-to-self and to others. Even so, this illustrates that through our ability to categorise, we have the ability to particularise and do more with the stimuli than accumulate more instances of predetermined categories (Billig, 1985). In Billigs alternative approach to stereotyping, he also raises the point of category selection a problem that cognitive psychologists have often overlooked. Tversky and Gati (1978) found that different stimuli are judged on their similarities and differences before categorisation and this judgement can be diff erent depending on what way the stimuli is perceived. Billigs point is that we must particularise before categorising and thus a link has been formed. Categorisation implies a rigidity in our cognition. Stereotypes, by nature, are over generalisations. Such inflexibility is not a possible process of our cognition categorisation do not exist in isolation (Billig, 1985). As categorisation leads to many categories, through its definition, surely only one such category could possibly be so rigid and inflexible, as other categories must be used by it, and thus be flexible. Therefore, categorisation is not a rigid process, but involves change which is reflective of our cognition and change is possible (conflicting with Allports definition). The difference between two groups affects other attributes of the out-group, including those that are similar to the in-group. By subdividing further such similarities, we are initiating a defence against change in our attitudes and categories. This inventiveness is another example of the flexibility of categorisation. In the most extreme cases, this can lead to an inventiveness demonstrated by racial theorists, which in fact, contradicts their prejudice and rigidity of categories. This flexibility can be illustrated further by studies that have shown that in stereotyping, people imply that most of a group posses a stereotypic trait but not all members. Thus, is the need for special cases, realisation of individualisation and tolerance (Billig, 1985). According to the cognitive approach, stereotyping is a group process. It may occur in groups, but it is the individual psyches that make up the group, that project their stereotypes through a group. We do have the ability to see people as individuals and particularise their unique characteristics. We can change, as even categorisation is flexible, which undermines the cognitive approach with categorisation, although it may take time on a social level. To conclude, the cognitive approach alone does not give us an understanding of stereotyping. However, it does anchor the fact that through our natural thought processes we do categorise, which leads to stereotyping. It also highlights the importance of the individual and the group. There are, however, problems that have been overlooked by cognitive psychologists which we need to understand, in order to fully understand the changing dynamics and nature of stereotyping in our society (Howitt, et al., 1989). There is also the need to look further than the causes of stereotyping and into its effects in order to understand the processes of our thought, of stereotyping. ReferencesALLPORT, G.W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. London: Addison-Wesley. BILLIG, M. (1985). Prejudice, categorisation and particularisation: From a perceptual rhetorical approach, European Journal of Social Psychology, 15, 70-103. BROWN, R. (1995). Prejudice. Oxford: Blackwell and Cambridge, Massachusetts. DUNCAN, B.L. (1976). Differential social perception and attribution of intergroup violence: Testing the lower limits of stereotyping blacks, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 590-598. ESSED, P. (1988). 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